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1. PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN SPAIN 
Public corruption, which can be defined as «the abuse of public power for private benefit»1, is 
not equally widespread among every public activity or service. There are, indeed, certain 
activities with more corruption risks, since only a few of them can generate enough potential 
private benefits. 
During the last years, the annual reports of the General State Prosecutor’s Office have 
identified urban planning and development as the sector of administrative activity most 
affected by corruption. According to these reports, in 2006 there was a significant increase in 
the number of investigations carried out by the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office  
about corruption in the field of urban planning2, and since then investigations into cases of 
urban planning and urban development corruption did only increase3 until 2010, year  in 
which for the first time the General State Prosecutor's Office noticed a decrease in the 
investigations related to this type of corruption4. 
Despite the decrease in the number of investigations carried out by the Prosecutor’s Office in 
this area, the report published in 2013, which is remarkable for addressing the problem of 
corruption in detail, showed that urban planning continued to be the main form of corruption 
in the courts of justice also in 20125, although to a lesser extent it also outlined corruption 
risks belonging to other public activities and sectors, such as the adjudication of public works 
and contracting public services trying to favor a company, and the management of public 
funds often in the form of a subsidy6. 
As the aforementioned report of 2013 emphasizes, the economic crisis has led to a decrease in 
                                                     
1 TANZI, VITO, “Corruption around the world. Causes, consequences, scope and cures”, International Monetary 
Fund Staff papers, vol. 45, num. 4, December 1998, pp. 559-594, p. 564. 
2 «Si hubiera que significar algún punto relevante referido a la actuación de la Fiscalía Anticorrupción en el 
pasado año 2006 […] éste es, sin duda, el importante aumento de investigaciones llevadas a cabo por la Fiscalía 
Especial en el ámbito de la corrupción urbanística», FISCALÍA GENERAL DEL ESTADO, Memoria 2007, Centro de 
estudios jurídicos-Ministerio de Justicia, Madrid, 2007, p. 335. 
3 See FISCALÍA GENERAL DEL ESTADO, Memoria 2008, Centro de estudios jurídicos-Ministerio de Justicia, 
Madrid, 2008, p. 916. 
4 «No obstante el descenso de las investigaciones sobre corrupción urbanística, no se ha producido un descenso 
en el trabajo de la Fiscalía», FISCALÍA GENERAL DEL ESTADO, Memoria 2011, Centro de estudios jurídicos- 
Ministerio de Justicia, Madrid, 2011, p. 731. 
5 «Hay una mayoría de Memorias de las Fiscalías Provinciales que relacionan corrupción con el urbanismo en 
los Ayuntamientos», FISCALÍA GENERAL DEL ESTADO, Memoria 2013, cit., p.655. 






corruption-related events7. This crisis, which has been particularly profound in the real estate 
sector, suggests that corruption linked to urban planning and development would not be so 
prominent and would not be the sector most affected by corruption8. 
In fact, this is evidenced by the data of investigations carried out by the Anti-Fraud Office of 
Catalonia. According to these data, which are given below in a table, in recent years public 
procurement would have tended to equate to urban planning as the sector most affected by 
corruption, equality that would definitely have been broken in 2013, when public 
procurement took off as the main area of public corruption, as can be seen in the table 
provided with the data related to investigations of 2013, 2015 or even 2016. In addition, 
corruption in the access to public employment has risen sharply since 2013, probably because 
of the high level of unemployment, which would have increased the risk of corruption in that 
area. 
Table 1. Investigations Data 
Subject 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 (2016) 
 Public procurement 7 13 17 7 18 7 
 Urban planning 7 12 8 8 4 1 
 Conflict of interests 4 3 8 13 8 1 
 Public subsidies/grants 1 4 3 2 3 0 
 
 
Source: Investigations data, from: https://www.antifrau.cat/images/web/docs/investigacio/20161215- investigacions.pdf. 
The information provided for the year 2016 includes the data until the 15 December 2016. 
Despite the variable risk level due to a fluctuating real estate market, the urban planning 
corruption has been the main type of public corruption in Spain at least since the decade of 
1990’9, and has probably had a significant impact on Spanish land and cities, and its 
                                                     
7 FISCALÍA GENERAL DEL ESTADO, Memoria 2013, cit., p. 658. 
8 VILLORIA, MANUEL and JIMÉNEZ, FERNANDO, “¿Cuánta corrupción hay en España? Los problemas 
metodológicos de la medición de corrupción (2004-2011)”, Revista de estudios políticos, núm. 156, abril-junio, 
2012, pp. 13-47, p. 37. 
9 See ROMERO, JUAN; JIMÉNEZ, FERNANDO and VILLORIA, MANUEL, “(Un)sustainable territories: causes of 
the speculative bubble in Spain (1996-2010) and its territorial, environmental and sociopolitical consequences”, 
Environmental and planning C: Government and policy, 2012, vol. 30, pp. 467-486. An analysis of urban 
planning corruption since the decade of 1950 could be found in CAPDEFERRO VILLAGRASA, OSCAR, El Derecho 
Public employment 2 5 14 5 12 3 
Others 0 4 1 2 1 2 







development. A urban overdevelopment has been encouraged by a confluence of interests: 
there has been important capital gains obtained by the owners who favored by the 
determinations of the urban plan have been recognized with rights to develop and build 
(sometimes as a consequence of corrupt exchanges), together with the own economic interest 
of the acting administration, which receives part of the use of the urban development since the 
reform of the land use law of 1975, in addition to their benefits obtained through the tax 
applied to building activity10. This overdevelopment has resulted in a severe environmental 
damage, not only by the urbanization of land that should be protected to safeguard its 
ecological or landscape value, but also by the pressure exerted on water resources11, 
especially in coastal areas12. 
In recent years have appeared a number of relevant reports13 which have echoed certain 
irregular or at least undesirable practices that had spread in the Spanish urban development 
causing serious damage, and in none of those reports is forgotten to mention that corruption 
has been behind those practices in some cases14. It is highlighted in these reports that often 
land has been classified as developable even when due to its natural characteristics it should 
have been classified (or should have maintained its former classification) as undevelopable15. 
In addition it is also observed a general overdevelopment of the territory, in such a way that 
                                                                                                                                                                     
administrativo y la prevención de la corrupción urbanística, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2016. 
10 CLAROS PEINADO, ROCÍO, "Urbanismo y financiación municipal ", in IGLESIAS, FELIPE (dir.), Urbanismo y 
democracia. Alternativas para evitar la corrupción, Fundación Alternativas, Madrid, 2007, pp. 133-145. 
11 LOZANO CUTANDA, BLANCA, “Urbanismo y corrupción: algunas reflexiones desde el Derecho 
Administrativo”, Revista de Administración Pública, num. 172, January-April 2007, pp. 339-361. 
12 The so-called Auken report referred to excessive urbanization in many coastal areas and noted that such a 
situation has led to an irreparable harm to biodiversity and environmental integrity, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
report on the impact of extensive urbanisation in Spain on individual rights of European citizens, the 
environment and the application of Community law, based on certain petitions received (2008 / 2248 (INI)), of 
February 20, 2009, p. 6. 
13 Since 2001, Greenpeace has published annually the report titled Destrucción a toda costa; and in 2007, 
Fundación Alternativas published the report Urbanismo y Democracia directed by FELIPE IGLESIAS. In addition, 
urban planning corruption is also included in the report by Miloon Kothari for the United Nations (UNITED 
NATIONS (GENERAL ASSEMBLY), Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the 
right to an adequate standard of living, Miloon Kothari. Addendum: mission to Spain A/HRC/7/16/Add.2, 7 
February 2008); and the so-called Auken report, submitted by the Committee on Petitions to the European 
Parliament also highlights the Spanish corruption in land use (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Report on the extensive 
urbanization in Spain on individual rights of European citizens, on the environment and on the application of the 
EU law, based upon petitions received (2008/2248 (INI)), Rapporteur: MARGRETE AUKEN, 20 February 2009.) 
14 According to Greenpeace, in certain cases, the baton that has directed the urban development on the Spanish 
coast has been the association of corruption and public administrations (GREENPEACE, Destrucción a toda costa 
2013. Análisis del litoral a escala municipal, Greenpeace, 2013, p. 54). 
15 IGLESIAS, FELIPE and AGUDO, JORGE, “Los mecanismos de la corrupción: tipología de irregularidades”, in 






this «unsustainable development model» has ended up spoiling areas of great environmental 
value, especially in coastal municipalities16. 
Regarding some other irregularities, it has been noticed that there are tendencies to increase 
the buildability to promote profitable uses of the land while sometimes it implies a breach of 
urban planning rules, which could affect the provisions of public housing regime and, by 
extension, the right to housing17 of social groups with fewer resources since, by effect of the 
speculation held on land and housing during the building boom years (1997-2007), they had 
serious difficulties to access to housing at market price18. 
In the field of building permits, the profusion of illegalities has been equally serious because 
on many occasions it has been granted illegal licenses that have authorized buildings that once 
acquired by third parties in good faith, are judicially annulled and its demolition is stated. 
This situation has affected many third parties not only national but also from other 
States19acquiring those buildings presumably in good faith, which acquired these properties 
without evidence of the litigious situation of the property, and whose subsequent demolition 
would affect their property rights. 
Finally, as to another area of corruption risk, the urban discipline, it is also reported the 
inability of the municipal public authorities to react by restoring the urban legality 
undermined by illegal constructions, and it gets highlighted how often such offences of 
individuals tend to remain unpunished or, if punished, it is usually settled with minor 
penalties20. 
 
                                                     
16 See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Report on the extensive urbanization in Spain on individual rights of European 
citizens, on the environment and on the application of the EU law, based upon petitions received (2008/2248 
(INI)), cit., pp. 6 and 9; and GREENPEACE, Destrucción a toda costa 2013, cit. p. 54. 
17 IGLESIAS, FELIPE and AGUDO, JORGE, “Los mecanismos de la corrupción: tipología de irregularidades”, cit., p. 
62. 
18 UNITED NATIONS (GENERAL ASSEMBLY), Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a 
component of the right to an adequate standard of living, Miloon Kothari. Addendum: mission to Spain, cit., p. 
27. 
19 See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Report on the extensive urbanization in Spain on individual rights of European 
citizens, on the environment and on the application of the EU law, based upon petitions received (2008/2248 
(INI)), cit. 







2. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION, AND ESPECIALLY THE 
POLITICAL DISCREDIT 
In this section I present some consequences of public corruption that have a significant bound 
with political discredit or, in a certain extent, that could have an impact on discrediting 
politics. Hence, in the following pages I will try to explain some issues about the relationship 
between public corruption and the citizens’ attitude about politics and politicians in particular, 
and how this could shape the way we understand and curb corruption in a specific society. 
2.1. The accusation of corruption used as a mere tool for political discredit 
in electoral campaign 
After the pertinent journalistic researches, the media have made public many of the cases of 
land use corruption, sometimes unveiling complex and organized criminal networks, and 
other times revealing mere occasional practices, that have called the attention of the 
citizenship and have received a broad coverage21. However, not all the journalistic 
contributions are equally reliable or precise, and the lack of impartiality and professionalism 
in some pieces of news has resulted in claims in respect of the right to honour of public 
officers that have been related with the urban planning corruption22. 
Also, it should not be forgotten that in many cases the press only echoes the often interested 
allegations of corruption made by political rivals. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that the 
reporting of corruption cases is frequently used as a one more element for the stigmatization 
of rival politicians during electoral campaigns23, since it has been empirically proven that the 
accusation of corruption influences, even if it does so in a moderate way, in the electors’ 
                                                     
21 For example, the so called Malaya case, referred to the corruption (especially, the land use corruption) that 
took place from the decade of 1990 in the City council of Marbella, occupied more than 30% of the total of news 
about corruption that were published in the Spanish newspapers El País and El Mundo in 2006, see PALAU, 
ANNA M. and DAVESA, FERRAN, “El impacto de la cobertura mediática de la corrupción en la opinión pública 
española”, Revista española de investigaciones sociológicas, num. 144, October-December 2013, pp. 97-126, p. 
111. 
22 See Spanish Supreme Court (Sala Primera, de lo Civil) sentence of 7th November of 2011, rec. n. 1420/2009, 
judge-rapporteur Juan Antonio Xiol Ríos. See also the analysis in DE LA IGLESIA PRADOS, EDUARDO, “El 
derecho al honor de los políticos frente a las acusaciones de corrupción en materia de urbanismo”, Revista de 
Derecho Privado, n. 4, July-August 2012, pp. 81-114. 
23 According to the annual reports of several provincial prosecutors, the electoral campaign significantly 
increases the number of reported acts that might constitute corruption offenses, generally being crossed 
accusations between members of different political parties with a clear intention to influence the electorate, see 







2.2. The instrumental use of Law and in particular the expansion of criminal law 
While administrative law has proven to be an ineffective instrument to protect public 
interests, criminal law has undergone a notable expansion25. Legislative policy has tended to 
extend the application of the penal code and to aggravate its sanctions on matters which, 
ordinarily, should be controlled and disciplined by the Administration through administrative 
law, such as the ethical behavior of the authorities and public officials. This has occasioned 
the use, sometimes excessive, of the criminal justice26. 
If the use of criminal control on the administrative action has been due to the inefficiency of 
the administrative instruments for the prevention and control of corruption, it seems 
surprising to choose that option instead of concentrating efforts to convert these ineffective 
controls into a more effective and efficient ones27, either by formally improving them or by 
incentivizing their effective implementation. 
It has been identified by the doctrine that turn to a reform of the Criminal Code, eminently 
repressive, as the main form of public authorities' response to the phenomenon of corruption 
has the risk of being nothing else than a «showcase legal response»28. With these types of 
measures, the government would seek to give the impression of acting with the greatest 
severity against the problem, with the expectation that this would bring benefits to its political 
party in electoral terms, while not caring at all for the effective application of these measures, 
which would allow politicians to maintain the status quo29 (which could imply the 
                                                     
24 See letter c of this section below. 
25 MUÑOZ MACHADO, SANTIAGO, Tratado de Derecho administrativo y Derecho público general, I. La 
formación de las instituciones públicas y su sometimiento al Derecho, Iustel, 2006, pp. 70 et seq., and SILVA 
SÁNCHEZ, JESÚS-MARÍA, La expansión del Derecho penal, Aspectos de la política criminal en las sociedades 
postindustriales, Civitas, 2nd ed., Madrid, 2001, p. 64 
26 This intense penalization of public performance has been seen with suspicion by Spanish doctrine: «[e]n 
efecto, “abierta la veda” de autoridades y funcionarios con el cambio constitucional, ha venido a producirse un 
fenómeno, preocupante por su intensidad, de judicialización de la vida política, esto es, de derivación hacia el 
orden jurisdiccional penal del enjuiciamiento de las conductas de autoridades y funcionarios en el ejercicio de 
sus cargos», GARCÍA DE ENTERRÍA, EDUARDO and FERNÁNDEZ, TOMÁS-RAMÓN, Curso de Derecho 
administrativo,I. Civitas, 15th ed., Madrid, 2011, p. 652. 
27 See TORNOS MAS, JOAQUÍN, “¿Quién debe ejercer el «ius puniendi» del Estado?”, Revista española de 
Derecho Administrativo, num. 161, January-March 2014, pp. 11-16, p. 13; and CARMONA SALGADO, 
CONCEPCIÓN, “Tratamiento penal de la ordenación del territorio y el urbanismo tras la reforma de 2010. Fracaso 
del control preventivo administrativo y corrupción urbanística”, La Ley Penal, num. 103, July, 2013. 
28 TORNOS MAS, JOAQUÍN, “¿Quién debe ejercer el «ius puniendi» del Estado?”, cit., p. 14. 






maintenance of the networks of corruption). 
While the penalties for crimes related to public corruption are increased and new criminal 
offences are established, the scarcity of means for its investigation and subsequent  
punishment is maintained30; the General State Prosecutor is appointed by the Government, 
with all the doubts that this generates regarding the impartiality of the prosecution31; and, if 
the aforementioned is insufficient to avoid convictions for crimes related to corruption, the 
exceptional measure of pardon still remains at the disposal of the Government, on which, 
despite the recent judicial decisions, judicial control remains rather limited32. 
2.3. The electoral punishment of corruption and the discrediting of politics 
Among the consequences of public corruption, we can identify the electoral punishment of 
political parties involved in corruption practices and the discrediting of politics, meaning that 
most citizens believe that all the political parties are equally corrupt. 
According to some estimates based on data from the Spanish local elections of 1999 and 
2007, the average loss of votes after a corruption scandal would be 4%, a percentage that 
increases as media attention increases, up to 9-14 %33. More recently, regarding the local 
elections in 2011, it has been observed that political parties accused of corruption lost an 
average of 5% more votes than in municipalities without corruption cases reported, although 
                                                     
30 It is representative that during the XXIII National Meeting of Spanish Chief Judges, held in Seville between 
the 16th and the 18th December 2013, judges proposed, for a more effective judicial fight against corruption, the 
assignation of more and sufficient personal and material means (reported in: 
http://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Poder_Judicial/En_Portada/Los_Jueces_Decanos_piden_mas_medios_para_ 
luchar_contra_la_corrupcion). Moreover, we could see the complaint contained in the annual report of the State 
Prosecutor General's Office of 2015: «Antes de entrar a concretar la actividad desarrollada por la Fiscalía 
Especial contra la Corrupción y la Criminalidad Organizada durante el año 2014 es de justicia manifestar, en un 
primer plano, el más profundo agradecimiento a cuantos integran la Fiscalía Especial, Fiscales […], unidades 
técnicas adscritas a la Fiscalía y demás funcionarios de la Administración de Justicia que colaboran con los 
anteriores, con cuya aportación y trabajo han hecho posible, hasta el máximo de sus posibilidades, llenar la 
escasez de los medios personales con que ha contado esta Fiscalía en el año 2014, afirmación especialmente 
aplicable a los Fiscales y Unidades Adscritas cuya composición apenas ha sufrido alteraciones en sus integrantes 
desde que se creó la Fiscalía Anticorrupción» (FISCALÍA GENERAL DEL ESTADO, Memoria 2015, Centro de 
estudios jurídicos-Ministerio de Justicia, Madrid, 2015, pp. 310-311). 
31 GRECO (Group of States against Corruption) had already warned of this problem in 2001 but, in the light of 
the limited progress made in this regard, it reported again the same issue in 2014, see GRECO,  Fourth evaluation 
round. Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. Evaluation report: 
Spain, 15th January 2014, p. 35. 
32 See CÓRDOBA RODA, JUAN and TORNOS MAS, JOAQUÍN, “El indulto y el control judicial de su 
concesión”,Revista Jurídica de Catalunya, vol. 113, núm. 1, 2014, pp. 39-78. 
33 COSTAS-PÉREZ, ELENA; SOLÉ-OLLÉ, ALBERT y SORRIBAS-NAVARRO, PILAR, “Corruption scandals, voter 






most mayors involved in corruption cases were reelected34. It has also been observed that 
electoral punishment does not occur in all cases of corruption: politicians who committed 
allegedly corrupt irregularities that in some way also benefited the municipality did not obtain 
electoral punishment but a benefit, receiving on average a greater support than what they 
would have obtained "without corruption", an electoral benefit that is estimated by the authors 
in the 4,8%35. 
2.4. The discrediting of politics as a determining factor in the fight against 
corruption: corruption as an agency problem vs. corruption as a collective 
action problem 
During the second half of the 20th century, some influential studies that revolutionized the 
way in which corruption had been understood and curbed were published36. Its great 
innovation consisted on applying to this phenomenon a theory from the economic sciences 
that had already demonstrated its functionality in the study of business organization: the 
agency theory37. 
The approach based on the agency theory is based on the premise that there are some 
principals who, in order to act, must use agents, who represent them, as could be the case of 
elected officials (agents) who represent the citizenry (multiple principals), or public officials 
and senior officers (agents) acting on behalf of the government or any hierarchical superior 
(principal), to give just a few examples. The goal sought in these agency relationships is for 
the agent to act serving the interests of the principal38. Otherwise, we would be faced with a 
                                                     
34 This is the general trend internationally. With data from the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom, see MUÑOZ, JORDI, “El precio electoral de la corrupción: ¿por qué los votantes la castigan tan poco?”, 
Pasajes, num. 42, pp. 23-24. 
35 BARBERÁ ARANGÜEÑA, PABLO and FERNÁNDEZ-VÁZQUEZ, PABLO, “Los electores ante la corrupción”, in 
ORTIZ, JAVIER and EMBID, JULIO (coords.), Informe sobre la democracia en España 2012, Fundación 
Alternativas, 2012, pp. 75-101. 
36 In particular, ROSE-ACKERMAN, SUSAN, Corruption: A study in political economy, Academic Press, Nueva 
York, 1978; and KLITGAARD, ROBERT, Controlling corruption, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988. 
37 JIMÉNEZ SÁNCHEZ, FERNANDO, “La trampa política: la corrupción como problema de acción colectiva”, in 
PASTOR SELLER, ENRIQUE; TAMEZ GONZÁLEZ, GERARDO; and SAENZ LÓPEZ, KARLA ANNETT CYNTHIA (eds.), 
Gobernabilidad, ciudadanía y democracia participativa: análisis comparado España-México, Dykinson, 
Madrid, 2014, pp. 157-174, p. 159. 
38 This theory has also been assumed among Spanish juridical-administrative doctrine. As a notable example, 
these words by ALEJANDRO NIETO, although using a different (but close) terminology, are certainly evocative of 
what the theory of the agency applied to corruption assumes: «La corrupción pública empieza cuando el Poder 
que ha sido entregado por los ciudadanos a título de administrador —o sea, para gestionarlo de acuerdo con los 
intereses generales— no es utilizado correctamente, sino que el gestor, defraudando la confianza de sus 






pathology in that relationship. 
Such authors have applied these premises of agency theory to the institutional framework in 
which principals and agents develop their activity, giving rise to the economic 
institutionalism, and, based on a rational choice model, they conclude that agents tend to be 
more tempted to betray the confidence of their principals when the possibilities of detection 
and the severity of the punishment of their irregular performance are scarcely dissuasive 
while the private benefit that they may obtain is high39. 
Theorists of economic institutionalism stated that cases of corruption are just the consequence 
of a pathological situation in the agency relationship, since they assume that the principal has 
some interests (for example, citizenship would have general public or common interests), and 
who should act on their behalf (government officials, senior officials and officials, for 
example), instead of acting in order to satisfy those interests of the principal, they take 
advantage of the power and position that has been conferred on them trying to obtain a private 
benefit different from the interests of the principal. Such a situation would be possible 
because of a lack of information from the principal, who would not have the sufficient means 
of control and sanction to properly warn and punish that betrayal in the relationship of trust. 
In conclusion, the agent would make a rational calculation, weighing the possibilities of 
detection and punishment for acting in pursuit of one’s own interests and in view of the fact 
that there would be more incentives than disincentives to betray the mission entrusted by the 
principal; he would act chasing his or her private interests. 
As a result, anti-corruption measures inspired by this scholar theory have focused on 
increasing knowledge about agents and their activities (eg, by declarations of assets, interests 
and activities, measures on transparency in public administrations, control or limitation of 
discretion, etc.)40. 
However, as a result of the unsuccessful outcome of enforcement measures and corruption 
sanctions in some countries41, authors such as BO ROTHSTEIN have questioned the validity of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
público, Ariel, Barcelona, 2008, p. 154). 
39 JIMÉNEZ, FERNANDO; GARCÍA-QUESADA, MÓNICA and VILLORIA, MANUEL, “Integrity systems, values and 
expectations: explaining differences in the extent of corruption in three Spanish local governments”, 
International Journal of Public Administration, num. 37, 2014, pp. 67-82, pp. 68-69. 
40 JIMÉNEZ SÁNCHEZ, FERNANDO, “La trampa política: la corrupción como problema de acción colectiva”, cit., 
pp. 161-162. 






the agency problem in dealing with corruption42. The main criticism has been that the agency 
model presumes that the problem is always the agent, who acts in pursuit of his personal 
interests (or those of his political party, or those of his family and friends) betraying the 
general interests that the principal pursues, at the same time as assuming that the principal 
does not have sufficient information about the agent or his activities. According to BO 
ROTHSTEIN et al. it is not taken into account that those measures of greater control and 
sanction of the "offender" agent only have validity as long as the same principal has a real 
interest in preventing and, where appropriate, punishing corruption. 
There are, indeed, cases where the principal also acts in pursuit of illicit particular interests. 
Some scholars have referred to those principals as "principals without principles"43, and it 
seems that in these situations, rather than an agency problem, we would be faced with a 
collective action problem44. 
This theory has its roots in the classic commons dilemma described by Garrett HARDIN in 
196845. According to HARDIN, in a situation in which several individuals act independently 
and rationally driven only by personal interests, they end up destroying a limited shared 
resource (the common good) even if for all of them the destruction of that common good is 
detrimental, both in individual and collective terms. According to this approach to the 
problem of corruption, it is understood that the performance of the subjects depends to a great 
extent on the expected performance of the rest of the society. Thus, if a large majority is 
expected to break the rules by acting in a corrupt manner, even though each of these people 
individually believes that a smaller level of corruption would be beneficial to society as a 
whole, the temptation of all subjects (including not only the agents but also the principal  
ones) to resort to corruption practices pursuing their personal interests is much greater46. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Corruption as a Collective Action Problem”, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, 
and Institutions, Vol. 26, num. 3, July 2013, pp. 449–471, p.449-450. 
42 ROTHSTEIN, BO, “Anti-corruption: the indirect ‘big bang’ approach”, cit. 
43 JIMÉNEZ SÁNCHEZ, FERNANDO, “La trampa política: la corrupción como problema de acción colectiva”, cit., p. 
164. 
44 PERSSON, ANNA; ROTHSTEIN, BO and TEORELL, JAN, “Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic 
Corruption as a Collective Action Problem”, cit. 
45 HARDIN, GARRETT, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, vol. 162, 1968, pp. 1243-1248. 
46 According to ANNA PERSSON et al., «actors engage in corrupt behavior not because they morally approve of it 
or do not understand the negative consequences for society at large, but because as long as they expect everyone 
else to play foul, they perceive the short-term benefits of engaging in corrupt behavior to be greater than the 
costs. In terms of one prototypical model of collective action, this game of corruption could be interpreted as an 






Given the different analysis, the proposed solutions should also be different, and classic 
measures inspired by agency theory could have counterproductive effects: for example, 
greater transparency could lead to more people being aware of the irregular functioning of 
public authorities, which could increase the number of people considering the necessity to 
participate in such illegal practices47. 
Following authors like SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN or BO ROTHSTEIN, it can be affirmed that the 
two approaches coexist. They are not excluded but each one is better to explain and to 
propose solutions to a different type of corruption. On the one hand, the analysis and 
proposals of the agency problem seem to work better in countries or regions where the legal 
system is appropriate to combat corruption and the cases of corruption are sporadic actions of 
people who, in the exercise of their public functions, seek to illicitly obtain a particular 
benefit48. On the other hand, the approach to the phenomenon as a problem of collective 
action seems appropriate for those cases in which the social perception of corruption is very 
high49 and also has acquired the condition of systemic50, where there would be few 
possibilities for a sincere willingness to combat corruption in the short term. In these contexts 
of systemic corruption, traditional measures inspired by agency models and rational choice 
would not be effective on their own and would require other measures51. 
At this point, we should ask to what theory or theories does Spanish land use corruption fit in? 
What kind of measures should be proposed in order to combat corruption effectively? 
We can say that the typical proposals of economic institutionalism, based on the theory of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
cheats (i.e., acts corruptly) as compared to the outcome where everyone plays foul. However, being the sole 
“sucker” in a corrupt game is the even worse outcome to everyone, which tends to lock the game into the 
suboptimal “corrupt” equilibrium as long as everyone expects everyone else to be corrupt» (PERSSON, ANNA; 
ROTHSTEIN, BO and TEORELL, JAN, “Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective 
Action Problem”, cit., p. 457). 
47 PERSSON, ANNA; ROTHSTEIN, BO and TEORELL, JAN, “Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic 
Corruption as a Collective Action Problem”, cit., pp. 464-465. 
48 ROSE-ACKERMAN, SUSAN, “The institutional economics of corruption”, in DE GRAAF, GJALT; VON MARAVIĆ, 
PATRICK and WAGENAAR, PIETER (eds.), The good cause: Theoretical perspectives on corruption, Barbara 
Budrich, Leverkusen, 2010, pp. 47-63, p. 51. 
49 In these cases, where intersubjective mistrust and the perception of the partial (or interested and corrupt) 
functioning of public institutions is widespread, it is considered to exist a vicious circle since such perception 
would feed more mistrust and the temptation to engage in corrupt practices. See JIMÉNEZ SÁNCHEZ, FERNANDO, 
“La trampa política: la corrupción como problema de acción colectiva”, cit., in particular pp. 164-169. 
50 ROTHSTEIN, BO, “Anti-corruption: the indirect ‘big bang’ approach”, cit., p. 231. 
51 For example, those presented by AZFAR, OMAR, “Disrupting corruption”, in SHAH, ANWAR (ed.), Performance 






agency and rational choice, require a principal interested in avoiding and punishing 
corruption. The principal can be both the citizenship in general and public entities or 
institutions with the capacity to control and punish corruption, or the entities or institutions 
that are in charge of configuring and endowing the entities in charge of such functions, 
exercising an indirect control with a significant impact on the persecution of corruption. 
With regard to the most obvious principal, which is the citizenship as a whole, collective 
action theorists have used the democratic elections as an indicator to determine whether or not 
it has a real will to punish corruption. According to this doctrine, the fact that corruption is 
not punished in the elections can indicate the lack of will to fight against corruption by this 
main group. As we have pointed out, in the Spanish case up to now the electoral punishment 
of corruption has been, at best, timid52. However, we believe, with SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, 
that this indicator can only be significant to the extent that, in an election, there is an honest 
and credible alternative53(moreover, we can add, that honest alternative should represent 
similar interests in several fields, since the vote is not only determined by political 
representatives’ ethics or honesty). My viewpoint is that the recent rise of political party 
Podemos, which has made the fight against corruption one of its hallmarks54, together with 
the recent efforts of all political parties (including those most affected by serious cases of 
corruption) to show a firm commitment in the fight against corruption55, makes me think that 
at least from the perspective of the principal understood as citizenship, there is in Spain a 
sincere desire to eradicate corruption in public life, a will that political parties try to channel 
in their own benefit in electoral terms. 
                                                     
52 BARBERÁ ARANGÜEÑA, PABLO and FERNÁNDEZ-VÁZQUEZ, PABLO, “Los electores ante la corrupción”, in 
ORTIZ, JAVIER and EMBID, JULIO (coords.), Informe sobre la democracia en España 2012, Fundación 
Alternativas, 2012, pp. 75-101. 
53 ROSE-ACKERMAN, SUSAN, “The institutional economics of corruption”, cit., p. 48. 
54 It is significant that this political party included Carlos Jiménez Villarejo, who was the anti-corruption chief 
prosecutor from 1995 to 2003, as number 3 in its list in the first elections to which the party was presented (the 
elections to the European Parliament in May 2014). Also, during the campaign of those elections, they proposed 
some measures mostly related to the fight against corruption and which they put together in a document referred 
to as the 'Villarejo Directive', intended to be risen to the European Parliament. See: 
http://podemos.info/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/directiva_ villarejo.pdf. 
55 Just as an example that occurred right after the elections to the European Parliament in May 2014, the political 
parties PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) and UPyD (Unión Progreso y Democracia) signed with 
Transparency International-Spain an agreement for transparency and against corruption on the 11 and 24 
November, respectively, by which signatory parties undertook to adopt the various measures for the  
transparency of parties and against corruption proposed and published by Transparency International-Spain. 
Also in November 2014, the President of the Spanish Government announced his willingness to give impetus to 






However, if we make a change in the principal position, the answer does not seem, for the 
moment, to point in the same direction. Many international bodies have certified that, in fact, 
the Spanish legal system has sufficient formal instruments to carry out a satisfactory fight 
against corruption, and yet such mechanisms have failed in many cases and are generally 
considered ineffective56. According to ALEJANDRO NIETO, public authorities, who are at the 
same time affected by corruption and in charge of preventing and repressing it, would have no 
interest in acting against themselves. While it is true that, as ALEJANDRO NIETO points out, the 
State as an abstract entity has an interest in combating corruption (in part, we could add: 
because this is the interest of the principal constituted by the citizenship), that State acts 
primarily through the Government, and although it proclaims its will to fight corruption, such 
an intention would be merely formal, limited to "launching measures without a fuse"57. In our 
political context, it should not be forgotten that, more than the Government, political parties 
are the ones who can influence all the public institutions58, and in addition, they have often 
benefited from corruption59. 
If we move to the field of Spanish urbanism, from multiple studies on the phenomenon in 
different parts of our geography we can draw that although there may also sometimes be a 
problem of collective action that would discourage the fight against corruption and favor the 
creation and expansion of networks of political patronage60, the most reasonable explanation 
for the large number of cases of urban corruption for more than a decade is surely offered by 
economic institutionalism, based on agency theory and rational calculation, as it seems that 
this public activity has been related for years to a very high potential benefits together with an 
                                                     
56 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, VILLORIA, MANUEL (Dir.) and BEKE, MIKE, B. (Coord.), El marco de  
integridad institucional en España. Situación actual y recomendaciones, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2012, pp. 6-
8, and EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Anexo: España, al Informe de lucha contra la corrupción de la UE, 2014, p. 16. 
57 NIETO, ALEJANDRO, El desgobierno de lo público, cit., p.174. 
58 According to NIETO, A.: «Un organismo normal dispone de mecanismos defensivos para contener invasiones 
y corregir desviaciones. Cuando esos mecanismos fallan o no existen, el organismo queda indefenso. Y esto es lo 
que cabalmente sucede en España con la corrupción, puesto que los partidos se  encargan de paralizar las 
reacciones defensivas del Estado y lo único que se hace es negar su existencia o, a todo lo más, conjurarla con 
remedios mágicos y retóricos de ineficacia probada» (NIETO, ALEJANDRO, El desgobierno de lo público, cit., p. 
179). 
59 For example, see the Auto del Juzgado Central de Instrucción num. 5 (Audiencia Nacional), 26 November 
2014, judge-rapporteur Pablo Rafael Ruz Gutiérrez; and EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Anexo: España, al Informe de 
lucha contra la corrupción de la UE, cit., p. 6. 
60 See GARCÍA-QUESADA, MÓNICA; JIMÉNEZ, FERNANDO and VILLORIA, MANUEL, “Can’t control/won’t control: 
opportunities and deterrents for local urban corruption in Lanzarote”, Crime, law and social change, November 






inefficient system of control, detection and punishment of corruption61. My own research, 
which in addition to being based on this doctrine has also considered and taken into account 
interviews with experts in the field and the study of sentences on cases of land use corruption, 
leads me to a diagnosis of the phenomenon to a great extent coincident62. 
As a result, I consider that Spanish corruption in land use is, at least on a theoretical level, 
close to what is proposed by economic institutionalism, according to the application of the 
agency problem and the rational choice. Hence, the proposals for preventing corruption in the 
next section (below) have the aim to modify the legal-administrative regulations in order to 
improve the capacity of the legal tools available. 
I believe, however, that it would be a grave mistake to ignore what in my view may be the 
greatest contribution of collective action theorists: sometimes the principal has no genuine 
interest in eradicating corruption.  
In the Spanish case it is not only those who hold public office or perform public functions 
who personally benefit from corruption, but in some cases the beneficiaries are also the 
political parties63. To this must be added that in Spain virtually all institutions suffer from an 
excessive politicization, so that, following ALEJANDRO NIETO, it seems easy to imagine why 
the rules that serve to guarantee the impartial exercise of public service (and, when 
appropriate, punish their infringement) have had a limited effect64. 
Faced with this problem, I understand that in order to combat corruption properly other 
elements and tools that are beyond the law should be used, such as citizen training in ethics, 
the political impartiality and a vigilant attitude of the media, or the "clean" and reliable 
alternatives to political parties and their representatives more strongly associated with 
corruption65. 
Law plays a necessary but not decisive role when there is an unprincipled principal or, at 
                                                     
61 See JIMÉNEZ, FERNANDO; GARCÍA-QUESADA, MÓNICA and VILLORIA, MANUEL, “Integrity systems, values and 
expectations: explaining differences in the extent of corruption in three Spanish local governments”, cit. 
62 See CAPDEFERRO VILLAGRASA, OSCAR, El Derecho administrativo y la prevención de la corrupción 
urbanística, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2016. 
63 JIMÉNEZ, FERNANDO and VILLORIA, MANUEL, “Political finance, urban development and political corruption 
in Spain”, cit., pp. 129-130. 
64 NIETO, ALEJANDRO, La corrupción en la España democrática, cit., pp. 203 y ss. 
65 See MUNGIU-PIPPIDI, ALINA, “The good, the bad and the ugly: controlling corruption in the Europan Union”, 







least, little determined to eradicate corruption. The proposals for fighting corruption should 
rely on the greater effectiveness of preventive measures to deal with the phenomenon of 
corruption, and in this respect I consider that the ideal instrument is in the legal-administrative 
order. Although the deficiencies of a legal system are not a relevant cause to explain 
corruption, it is possible to identify in the regulation those shortcomings that, far from 
hindering it, facilitate corruption66, maintaining ineffective prevention systems and 
inoperative punishing mechanisms with little dissuasive effect. 
Although I trust in Law as a system to ensure a good administration, a good governance and 
an effective fight against corruption, a lack of will in the application of the prevention, control 
and sanction mechanisms may undoubtedly lead to a failure of that legal system. With that 
threat in mind, I tried to equip the proposals below with the capacity to increase the degree of 
effectiveness and visibility of the control carried out by those control bodies a priori better 
positioned, based on their supposed higher degree of independence and technical preparation 
to carry out such control functions. Moreover, formative instruments for public employees 
and officials should be considered, such as codes of conduct and their associated training and 
monitoring systems. Of course, as I have already pointed out, other measures would be 
necessary, measures that are more related to education, ethics and values than to law67 but, as 
JESÚS GONZÁLEZ maintains, the fact that corruption cannot be eradicated only by means of 
legal rules, that should not prevent passing, as far as possible, the measures available to deal 
with it68. 
3. URBAN PLANNING CORRUPTION IN SPAIN AND ITS PREVENTION: A 
PROPOSAL 
According to the main bibliographical and jurisprudential material available, I have identified 
                                                     
66 According to MIGUEL SÁNCHEZ, «la evolución reciente de nuestro Derecho público ha facilitado el desarrollo 
de la corrupción política en vez de ponerle freno» (SÁNCHEZ MORÓN, MIGUEL, “La corrupción y los problemas 
del control de las administraciones públicas”, in LAPORTA, FRANCISCO J. and ÁLVAREZ, SILVINA (eds.), La 
corrupción política, Alianza editorial, Madrid, 1997, pp. 189-210, p. 191). 
67 In this regard, see PAREJO ALFONSO, LUCIANO, “Urbanismo y corrupción: un problema no solo de legalidad”, 
Temas para el debate: revista de debate político, núm. 223, 2013, pp. 35-41, p. 41; BOIX PALOP, ANDRÉS, 
“Modelos de financiación de partidos políticos y corrupción”, in JAREÑO LEAL, ÁNGELES (Dir.), Corrupción 
pública: cuestiones de política criminal (I), Iustel, Madrid, 2014, pp. 161-195, p. 162, p. 165; and IGLESIAS RÍO, 
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ámbito de la Unión Europea”, Revista Penal, num. 14, 2004, pp. 49-69, p. 64. 
68 GONZÁLEZ PÉREZ, JESÚS, Corrupción, ética y moral en las Administraciones públicas, Civitas, 2nd ed., 






some defining notes of the Spanish public corruption. First of all, public corruption in general, 
and corruption in urban planning and development in particular, is, although widespread, a 
relatively infrequent phenomenon. Apart from exceptional cases like the case of corruption in 
the Marbella Town Hall69, it does not form part of the normal functioning of public 
administrations. Secondly, public corruption in general is, essentially, the corruption  of 
politicians (members of the Government, senior officials and personnel of confidence), much 
more than the corruption of professional civil servants70. In third place, the weakness  of 
Spanish institutions to combat corruption lies not in the lack of formal legal instruments, but 
in their effectiveness in practice71. 
Urban corruption is caused in any case by the concurrence of great benefits to developable 
land owners, ineffective control mechanisms and a sanctioning system insufficiently 
dissuasive72, accompanied by a lack of adequacy between the individual behavior of public 
officers or civil servants and public ethics73. Occasionally, some additional causes are added, 
as the regulatory complexity in the land use field. Specifically, the land use areas with the 
greatest risks of corruption are urban planning, the granting of building permits and the 
exercise of urban development discipline74. 
On the basis of these synthetic characteristics, I propose the following in order to develop a 
better and more effective fight against corruption: 
a) The continuous corruption risks assessment and management and its concretion in the 
urban field 
                                                     
69 Regarding the public corruption in Marbella, see PÉREZ FRANCESCH, JOAN L.; COCCIOLO, ENDRIUS E. and 
EYRE DE LORENZO, JOSÉ A., “Disolución de los ayuntamientos en España y corrupción sistémica. Aproximación 
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299-324. 
70 According to an estimate made by MANUEL VILLORIA and FERNANDO JIMÉNEZ from the data published in the 
annual reports of the General State Prosecutor's Office between 2004-2010, ratios of crime, even if they are 
approximate, are almost 100 to 1 between politicians and public employees (VILLORIA, MANUEL and JIMÉNEZ, 
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71 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Annex: Spain, to the EU Anti-corruption Report, COM(2014) 38 final, 2014, pp. 
14-16. 
72 Among others, see JIMÉNEZ, FERNANDO; GARCÍA-QUESADA, MÓNICA and VILLORIA, MANUEL, “Integrity 
systems, values and expectations: explaining differences in the extent of corruption in three Spanish local 
governments”, International Journal of Public Administration, núm. 37, 2014, pp. 67-82. 
73 Among others, NIETO, ALEJANDRO, “¿Es inevitable la corrupción?”, in Responsa iurisperitorum digesta, vol. 
IV, Universidad de Salamanca, 2004, pp. 101-114, p. 112. 






To perform an adequate fight against this phenomenon we understand that it is necessary to 
introduce a mechanism to assess and manage corruption risks, which in our view should be 
done by using two different instruments. Firstly, the State must prepare an annual report 
indicating which areas are subjected to a greater risk of corruption in public administration at 
all territorial levels. That report should be based on data obtained from various sources, such 
as periodic surveys among public officials and employees about the risks and vulnerabilities 
of their post, the analysis of the discovered cases of public corruption or queries to external 
experts from both the professional and academic fields. Using as an example the urban 
planning corruption, this type of report when referring to the municipal level will probably 
identify as areas of corruption risk the preparation of urban plans, the granting of building 
permits and the exercise of urban development discipline; with special risk with regard to the 
involvement of Mayors, Councilors and municipal architects or surveyors. 
The second report that should be added would be an ad hoc evaluation on the risks of 
corruption which should also identify measures that can (or should) be taken in order to 
prevent corruption in each case. That evaluation should be conducted by any administration in 
the context of the development of all the own acts or own provisions that have been 
previously identified as performances at high risk of corruption in the annual report proposed 
in the previous paragraph. This singular corruption risk assessment aims to inform subjects 
that must take part in the procedure with risks of corruption of what specifically are the issues 
that can compromise the performance of its functions in accordance with public ethics and 
good governance, as well as propose the practices to be followed to avoid the appearance of 
corruption. So as to ensure the effectiveness of the measure once the procedure under 
corruption risks ends, a second report is needed to assess the degree of compliance with 
anticorruption measures. 
b) Promoting the use of precautionary measures in court 
For years, most of the illegal constructions have come to completion even when at an early 
stage they were challenged before the judicial authorities. Even when the sentence, pursuant 
to legislation, has imposed the demolition of the illegally built, it has been frequent not to 
apply its judgment on its own terms. This situation can be especially serious when these 
constructions are allowed by urban plans or illegal building permits that were adopted 
essentially by the intermediation of any form of urban corruption. In that case, the illegal 






highlights the weakness of the public controls. Notwithstanding, this unsustainable situation 
can be corrected through the effective implementation of precautionary measures which, to 
date, the judges have been using very limitedly in court. To ensure that these precautionary 
measures are broadly adopted when appropriate in the urban field, we believe that an 
amendment of law 29/1998, of 13 July, regulating the administrative jurisdiction (LJCA), is 
needed. Firstly, it should allow the judges and courts to adopt ex officio precautionary 
measures in those cases in which there are high risks of corruption. Secondly, in those cases 
where there is a risk of corruption it should be required to adopt precautionary measures when 
allegations of the plaintiffs are based on specific public corruption practices which, in his 
view, are directly related to the adoption of the contested act or general provision. 
c) Strengthening the involvement of officials with national qualification and their 
impartiality 
This staff in local government, in principle, can act more independently and it is also one of 
the most prepared for a thorough report on the legality of the actions taken at the local level. 
Consequently, we believe that it is necessary for the Secretary (a local official with national 
qualification) to intervene in those urban processes in which there are high risks of corruption, 
in such a way in that their reports should be mandatory in the preparation of development 
plans and the granting of building permits. This provision implies to modify all that regional 
urban planning regulations, such as the Land Use Act of Catalonia, in which the mandatory 
intervention of the Secretary is not guaranteed in every procedure with high risk of 
corruption, such as the granting of building permits75. As additional measures, which would 
result in a better quality and objectivity of these reports, it is desirable that no organ of the 
local Corporation could be competent to impose disciplinary sanctions on officials of local 
government with national qualification. Moreover, it should not be allowed in any 
municipality to cover the jobs reserved for officials of local government with national 
qualification by the system of free designation (which also includes free removal). 
d) The ethics training 
As much as the urban planning system is designed so that it can provide great benefits to 
individuals through administrative acts insufficiently controlled and sanctioned, ultimately it 
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is in the inner individual level where the person who performs public functions decides 
whether or not to ignore the general interests of their own office in favor of its private 
interests. In this situation ethical values and codes of conduct play a key role. Therefore, it 
seems highly advisable that codes of conduct should cover how to deal with situations that 
can attend any risk of corruption, and endow an entity with material and personal means 
enough to be able to provide training sessions on ethical issues related to the provision of 
urban services. This training should be taken for those who are particularly vulnerable to 
urban planning corruption, in special Mayors, Councilors in urban planning and municipal 
architects and surveyors. The training should be a requirement, if not for entering upon the 
duties of a public office or employment, then at least to participate in any of the urban 
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